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NOTES
STATE V. COWAN: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MONTANA'S ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE
Stephanie C. Stimpson
Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on vol-
untary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on
those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to
distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably
necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and
useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of
honours and of punishments.
Aristotle'
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1994, Joe Junior Cowan petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to challenge the con-
stitutionality of Montana's statutory scheme governing mental dis-
ease and defect.2 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving
Montana's statutory scheme intact. Fifteen years ago, the Montana
Legislature passed an act that effectively abolished the insanity de-
fense.3 Montana remains one of only three states which adopted so
drastic a measure to reform criminal responsibility law. 4 Advocates
1. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NicOMACHEA 1109b (W. Ross trans., 1925).
2. State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 861 P.2d 884 (1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3640
(U.S. Mar. 28, 1994) (No. 93-1264).
3. 1979 Mont. Laws 1979.
4. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102, -103, -311 (1993); see also IDAHO CODE § 18-
207 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1990 & Supp. 1993). Three other states en-
acted statutes barring all evidence of mental condition, but the state supreme courts found
the statutes unconstitutional. See Sinclair v. Mississippi, 132 So. 581, 584-87 (Miss. 1931)
(McGowen, J., concurring) (finding violations of federal Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses); Louisiana v. Lange, 123 So. 639 (La. 1929) (find-
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of Montana's statutory scheme argue that the abolition of the in-
sanity defense protects society from dangerous criminals and re-
stricts fraudulent uses of the insanity defense.5 Opponents criticize
the abolition of the insanity defense on constitutional and moral
grounds as a violation of traditional notions of fairness, which re-
sults in cruel and unusual punishment and deprivation of due pro-
cess.' These countervailing policy interests present legislators with
the difficult task of balancing the protection of society with mercy
for the mentally ill. State v. Cowan exemplifies the conflicting in-
terests and the consequences of the Montana Legislature's attempt
to address the dilemma presented in cases involving a mentally ill
defendant.
Since ancient times, legal systems throughout the world have
recognized the insanity defense.7 The rationale behind the insanity
defense is that a fair and moral system does not punish the men-
tally ill who inherently lack criminal intent." The basis of this ex-
emption from culpability generally relies on cognitive or volitional
theories.' The cognitive theory of the insanity defense exempts de-
fendants unable to understand the nature or criminality of their
conduct.1" Volitional theories afford additional protection for de-
fendants who act involuntarily and are unable to conform their
conduct to the law."
The insanity defense came under a great deal of public criti-
cism after the murder trials of Jack Ruby, Charles Manson, and
Sirhan Sirhan, who each pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. 2
Public discomfort reached the point of outrage when a federal
court acquitted John Hinckley based on the insanity defense."3
ing violation of Due Process); Washington v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1023-24 (Wash. 1910)
(finding a violation of the state Due Process Clause).
5. See, e.g., Abraham L. Halpern, The Insanity Verdict, the Psychopath, and Post-
Acquittal Confinement, 24 PAC. L.J. 1125 (1993); Lynn E. Thomas, Breaking the Stone Tab-
let: Criminal Law Without the Insanity Defense, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 239 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Jonas Robitscher & Andrew K. Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity De-
fense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9 (1982).
7. For example, the Greeks allowed an excuse when Orestes killed his mother to
avenge his father. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 77 (1973); see also ARISTOTLE,
supra note 1.
8. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 6, at 9-10.
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part II.A.
11. See infra part II.B.
12. SLOVENKO, supra note 7.
13. See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1981). John
Hinckley became obsessed with actress Jodie Foster and tried to impress her by attempting
to assassinate President Reagan. Id.; see also Halpern, supra note 5, at 1144; Ira Mick-
enberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded in
Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55
[Vol. 55
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United States v. Hinckley and other similar acquittals led mem-
bers of congress to propose and adopt several reforms to laws ad-
dressing criminal responsibility for the mentally ill.14 Today, legis-
lators and courts continue the struggle to achieve a statutory
structure for criminal responsibility that both protects the inter-
ests of the mentally ill and promotes public safety.
1 5
This Note discusses the constitutionality of Montana's mental
defect statutes and judicial application as demonstrated by State
v. Cowan. Part II sets forth the historical background of the in-
sanity defense and the modern tests of criminal responsibility.
Part III describes Montana's statutory scheme and the cases that
have challenged Montana's abolition of the insanity defense. Part
IV discusses State v. Cowan and its dissent. Part V analyzes Mon-
tana's abolition of the insanity defense and the constitutionality of
Montana's mental defect statutes. Part VI concludes that Mon-
tana's mental defect statutes violate the mentally ill defendant's
constitutional rights and that the concepts of due process and or-
dered liberty require some form of the insanity defense.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Ideas of criminal responsibility and distinctions between in-
tentional and unintentional acts date back to Hebrew law and were
further developed by Plato and Aristotle. 6 A test for criminal re-
sponsibility based on knowledge of good and evil existed in English
law as early as the fourteenth century. 7 The early tests focused on
the need for mens rea,' s or wrongful intent, to justify the imposi-
tion of criminal responsibility.19 The famous M'Naghten ° case
U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 946 (1987); David B. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 528, 537 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). Other re-
forms included changing the test for insanity, imposing a higher burden of proof on defend-
ants using the defense, and instituting the "diminished capacity" rule in which insanity
serves as a mitigating factor. Comment, The Insanity Defense: Should Louisiana Change
the Rules?, 44 LA. L. REV. 165, 169-78 (1983); see also Mickenberg, supra note 13 (discussing
the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict).
15. Most debates on the insanity defense focus on the burden of proof and the appro-
priate treatment and release of mentally ill defendants. DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 35 (4th ed. 1992).
16. Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong"
Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An
Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1228-29 (1966).
17. Id. at 1233.
18. "[Gluilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (6th
ed. 1991).
19. Recent Development, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1135 (1991).
20. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Scholars have not determined
1994]
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provided the guidelines for the insanity defense that still prevail in
many American jurisdictions. 1
A. M'Naghten Rules
In 1843, a British court acquitted Daniel M'Naghten who had
attempted to assassinate the British Prime Minister, but who mis-
takenly murdered the Prime Minister's secretary.22 For the first
time, a court permitted a defendant to rely on scientific evidence
from the field of psychiatry to establish a defense of nonresponsi-
bility due to mental illness.23 The acquittal, however, enraged
much of the British public and resulted in legal and political de-
bates as to the validity of the insanity defense. 2' As a result, Queen
Victoria demanded that the House of Lords summon the common-
law judges to explain and justify the acquittal.2" Accordingly, the
judges announced the M'Naghten Rules and established what is
commonly known as the right/wrong test of criminal responsibil-
ity.26 The rules stated that a defendant trying to use an insanity
defense must prove that, at the time of the crime, either he did not
know the "nature and quality" of his act or he did not know that
the act was wrong.
the correct spelling of Daniel M'Naghten's name. Its spelling varies between sources from
M'Naghton to McNaughten. The most common spelling, though probably incorrect, is
M'Naghten. See Bernard L. Diamond, On the Spelling of Daniel M'Naghten's Name, 25
OHIO ST. L.J. 84 (1964).
21. While M'Naghten clarified the right-wrong test, the theories behind it were al-
ready well-established in the common law. See, e.g., Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695
(1724) (adopting a test for criminal responsibility based on the cognitive and volitional ca-
pacities of the defendant). Today, approximately half the states either use the right-wrong
test from M'Naghten or a close version of it. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 33-34.
22. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720; see Mickenberg, supra note 13, at 944.
23. The defense relied on the theory of psychiatry that a defect in the defendant's
personality, such as M'Naghten's delusions of persecution, could cause him to commit a
crime, even though he could otherwise distinguish between right and wrong. Mickenberg,
supra note 13, at 945.
24. Mickenberg, supra note 13, at 945 (suggesting that this same debate has endured
for 140 years as evidenced by a comparison of the reactions to the acquittals of M'Naghten
in 1843 and John Hinckley in 1982).
25. Jeanne M. Bender, After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity Defense in
Montana, 45 MONT. L. REV. 133, 134 (1984).
26. Id. at 134-35.
27. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. The court concluded that:
[tihe jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be
sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,
until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence
[sic] on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
4
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Although M'Naghten formed the basis for the insanity defense
in American law, courts have interpreted the two parts of the cog-
nitive test in various ways.28 The test analyzes defendants' cogni-
tive states and moral judgments, not their emotional or volitional
states.29 Essentially, the M'Naghten test determines whether a de-
fendant knew the conduct was wrong when the defendant commit-
ted the crime." Some courts have criticized the M'Naghten test
because it failed to address defendants who acted involuntarily
and could not conform their conduct to the law.
3 1
B. Irresistible Impulse Test
As a result of the criticism of the M'Naghten test, courts de-
veloped the irresistible impulse test, which requires both cognition
and freedom of will for criminal responsibility.32 An Alabama court
explained the irresistible impulse test in Parsons v. Alabama.
33
That decision stated that a court should acquit a defendant if he
met the M'Naghten criteria or if "he had ... lost the power to
choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in
question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed. ' '3 4 The
court intended to protect defendants who possessed the cognition
described in the M'Naghten test, but lacked volitional capacity
wrong.
Id.
28. Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the
Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (1986).
Some courts have narrowly interpreted the first part of the test-knowledge of the nature of
the act-to mean awareness of the physical nature and consequences of the act. Other
courts have construed the required knowledge more broadly to include awareness of the
person's relation to others, ability to reason, and capacity to appreciate the significance of
the act. Id. Compare Arizona v. Brosie, 553 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Ariz. 1976) (adopting a narrow
interpretation) with Connecticut v. Conte, 251 A.2d 81, 82 (Conn. 1968) (interpreting the
first part of the test broadly to include capacity to reason and understand the act). Courts
have interpreted the second part of the test, understanding of the wrongfulness of the act,
to refer to the legal criminality of the conduct. Other courts have included knowledge of
legal and moral wrongness in the second prong of the test. Sendor, supra, at 1382. Compare
Iowa v. Haman, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979) (using a narrow interpretation) with
South Carolina v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 304 (S.C. 1978) (including both legal and moral
wrongness in a broad interpretation).
29. M'Naghten's right-wrong test remains the most prominent formulation of the in-
sanity test. ZUCKERMAN ET A., supra note 15, at 33. The American Bar Association (ABA)
supports the use of an exclusively cognitive test for the insanity defense. Wexler, supra note
13, at 532.
30. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 79.
31. See, e.g., Parsons v. Alabama, 2 So. 854, 865-66 (Ala. 1887).
32. Sendor, supra note 28, at 1383.
33. 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887).
34. Parsons v. Alabama, 2 So. at 866.
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and the ability to control or resist their actions. 6
C. The Product Test
In Durham v. United States,36 the court applied the product
test that exculpated a defendant whose "unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect."37 The product test
permitted evidence of all aspects of the defendant's mental illness
that could influence or cause the criminal conduct, instead of re-
stricting the evidence to specific cognitive or volitional incapaci-
ties." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, over-
ruled Durham and its product test in 1972 because the test failed
to provide adequate guidance to courts and jurors about the excul-
patory nature of mental illness.39
D. Model Penal Code Test
During the 1950's, the American Law Institute formulated the
Model Penal Code Test for insanity that exculpated a defendant if
''at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lack[ed] substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminal-
ity [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law."' 0 Thus, the Model Penal Code test encom-
passed aspects of both M'Naghten's test and the irresistible im-
pulse test.'1 Almost half the states used this test for insanity, but
several states abandoned it following Hinckley's acquittal and the
resulting concern about the early release of dangerous
defendants."2
35. Id. at 859.
36. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
37. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75. An earlier version of the product test appeared in
New Hampshire in 1869. New Hampshire v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
38. Sendor, supra note 28, at 1385-86.
39. See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 991; see also Sendor, supra note 28, at 1386 n.73.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
41. Sendor, supra note 28, at 1387. Sendor describes three significant aspects to the
drafter's choice of words:
(1) The drafters used the word "appreciate" instead of "know" to include emotional
awareness as well as intellectual awareness.
(2) The use of the words "conform his conduct" instead of "irresistible impulse" per-
mits the defense to apply to planned acts as well as sudden acts.
(3) The provision excusing the defendant who lacks "substantial" cognitive or volitional
capacity exculpates defendants who are greatly impaired as well as totally impaired.
Sendor, supra note 28, at 1387-88 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmts. 2-4, at 157-59
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1955)).
42. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 34.
[Vol. 55
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E. Insanity Defense Reform Act Test
In 1984, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act. 43
The federal insanity defense test combines the M'Naghten test
and the cognitive prong of the Model Penal Code test. Under the
federal insanity defense test, a court may acquit a defendant who,
"as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts."" The federal test eliminates the volitional prong of the
Model Penal Code Test and requires that the defendant suffer a
severe mental disease or defect.' The Insanity Defense Reform
Act requires defendants to prove by clear and convincing evidence
their insanity.'
F. Other Formulations of the Insanity Defense
Several states have adopted an alternative to the insanity de-
fense that results in a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill.' 7 In cases
involving a guilty but mentally ill verdict, the mental illness ob-
structs the defendant's capacity at the time of the crime, but not
to the extent that the defendant was legally insane.'8 Other states
have adopted the use of the Diminished Capacity Rule, which al-
lows a defendant's mental illness to serve as a mitigating factor or
as evidence that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to
commit a crime.'9
III. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW IN MONTANA
Before 1979, Montana's treatment of criminal responsibility
law followed the national trend and embodied similar aspects of
different tests and theories of insanity. In 1899, the Montana Su-
preme Court adopted a test for the insanity defense that combined
the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests.50 The legislature pre-
scribed the Model Penal Code test in 1967 but changed the word-
ing from "lacks substantial capacity" to "is unable," thus imposing
43. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988)).
44. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a). Federal courts and approximately two-thirds of the state juris-
dictions follow this allocation of the burden of proof. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at
35.
47. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 37.
48. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 37.
49. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 37-38.
50. See State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169 (1899).
1994]
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a higher burden on the defendant.5 1 In 1979, the legislature abol-
ished the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect.5 2 The leg-
islature's action resulted from increasing frustration with perceived
fraudulent assertions of the insanity defense and the growing role
of psychiatrists in criminal trials.5  The legislators shifted the
Model Penal Code test for insanity to the sentencing statutes and
placed consideration of a defendant's mental defect in the post-
conviction phase of the criminal proceedings.5
A. Montana's Statutory Scheme Governing Mental Disease
and Defect
Montana's present statutory structure governing mental defect
allows a court to evaluate a defendant's mental illness at three
stages of a trial. Initially, mental health professionals evaluate a
defendant for competency to stand trial. 55 The defendant's compe-
tency depends on the ability to "understand the proceedings" and
"assist in .. .his own defense. '56 If adjudged competent, the de-
fendant may only use evidence of insanity during trial to contest
the mental state element of a crime.5 7 In most criminal cases, the
state must prove a mental state of "purposely," "knowingly," or
"negligently" in order to impose criminal responsibility.58 Once
convicted, the defendant may introduce evidence of mental illness
during the sentencing hearing so the court can send the defendant
to a facility appropriate to meet the defendant's needs. 9
51. MONT. REV. CODE § 95-501 (1947); see Bender, supra note 25, at 136.
52. 1979 Mont. Laws 1979.
53. Bender, supra note 25, at 137 & n.30.
54. Bender, supra note 25, at 136-37.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-103 (1993).
56. Section 46-14-103 of the Montana Code provides in full that "[a] person who, as a
result of mental disease or defect, is unable to understand the proceedings against the per-
son or to assist in the person's own defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the
commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-103
(1993).
57. Section 46-14-102 of the Montana Code states that "[e]vidence that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible to prove that the defendant did or did
not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102
(1993).
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(33), (37), (58) (1993).
59. Section 46-14-311 of the Montana Code provides:
Whenever a defendant is convicted on a verdict or a plea of guilty and claims that
at the time of the commission of the offense of which convicted the defendant was
suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant unable to
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's behavior or to conform the defend-
ant's behavior to the requirements of law, the sentencing court shall consider any
relevant evidence presented at the trial and shall require additional evidence as it
considers necessary for the determination of the issue, including examination of
510 [Vol. 55
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B. Cases Challenging Montana's Statutory Scheme
In addition to Cowan, two cases have challenged the constitu-
tionality of Montana's abolition of the insanity defense.60 In both
cases, the defendants unsuccessfully asserted that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause require some form of the
insanity defense."1
1. State v. Korell
In State v. Korell,62 the defendant was charged with at-
tempted deliberated homicide and aggravated assault. Korell's de-
fense claimed that he lacked the requisite mental state by reason
of insanity. Korell, a Vietnam veteran who suffered from a para-
noid disorder, worked at a Missoula hospital as an extern under
the supervision of Greg Lockwood. Korell's relationship with Lock-
wood deteriorated until the hospital finally transferred Korell." In
June 1982, Korell returned to Missoula because he felt that he had
to kill Lockwood before Lockwood killed him. He entered Lock-
wood's house and began firing his gun at Lockwood and his wife.
Lockwood, after suffering gun and knife wounds, eventually sub-
dued Korell6
Before trial, Korell sought a writ of supervisory control declar-
ing that he had a right to rely on the defense that he suffered from
a mental disease or defect at the time he committed the crimes.
The Montana Supreme Court denied the writ. During trial, the
district court instructed that the jury could take into account the
defendant's mental disease or defect only insofar as it negated the
defendant's requisite state of mind. The jury found Korell guilty
on both counts. 6
Korell raised several issues on appeal, the most important be-
ing whether a defendant has a constitutional right to raise insanity
as an independent defense . 7 The Korell case presented the first
the defendant and a report of the examination ....
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (1993).
60. State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 690 P.2d 992 (1984); State v. Byers, - Mont.
-, 861 P.2d 860 (1993).
61. KoreU, 213 Mont. at 330, 690 P.2d at 1000; Byers, - Mont. at - , 861 P.2d at
867.
62. 213 Mont. 316, 690 P.2d 992 (1984).
63. KoreU, 213 Mont. at 319, 690 P.2d at 994.
64. Id. at 320, 690 P.2d at 995.
65. Id. at 320-21, 690 P.2d at 995.
66. Id. at 321-22, 690 P.2d at 996.
67. Id. at 322, 690 P.2d at 996.
1994]
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direct constitutional challenge to Montana's abolition of the in-
sanity defense. Korell argued that Montana's abolition of the in-
sanity defense violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process and his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. 8 The court in Korell discussed the history of
the insanity defense and the traditional doctrine of mens rea,
which states that without criminal intent, no blameworthiness or
crime exists.
The court ultimately held that Montana's consideration of
mental disease or defect at the three different stages of criminal
proceedings adequately protects a defendant with a mental ill-
ness." The court concluded that the insanity defense is not a fun-
damental right and that Montana's statutory scheme does not un-
constitutionally shift the burden of proof on the mental state
element of the crime.
7 0
2. State v. Byers
Montana's statutory scheme governing mental disease or de-
fect was not challenged again until 1993 in State v. Byers.7 1 In By-
ers, the defendant fatally shot two Montana State University stu-
dents in a dormitory room on campus. Byers was arrested and
charged with two counts of deliberate homicide. At the arraign-
ment, Byers gave notice that he would introduce evidence of
mental disease or defect during trial. 2
Byers underwent psychiatric evaluations conducted by Warm
Springs State Hospital, a psychiatrist for the State, and a forensic
psychiatrist whom Byers obtained. During trial, Byers introduced
evidence that he suffered from borderline personality disorder. By-
ers alleged that, at the time of the murders, he suffered from a
derealized state and, therefore, he did not act knowingly, pur-
posely, or voluntarily. The State contended that Byers did act with
68. Id. at 327, 332, 690 P.2d at 998, 1001.
69. Id. at 322-23, 690 P.2d at 996-97. The court further stated that "the attendant
stigma of a criminal conviction is mitigated by the sentencing judge's personal consideration
of the defendant's mental condition and provision for commitment to an appropriate insti-
tution for treatment, as an alternative to a sentence of imprisonment." Id. at 334, 690 P.2d
at 1002.
70. Id. at 330, 690 P.2d at 1000 (relying on Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952),
which upheld the Oregon statute requiring the defendant to prove insanity beyond a reason-
able doubt).
71. - Mont. - , 861 P.2d 860 (1993). The Montana Supreme Court decided the
appeals of Byers and Cowan at the same time and applied basically the same analysis to
both cases regarding the constitutionality of Montana's statutory structure governing
mental disease and defect.
72. Byers, - Mont. at - , 861 P.2d at 864.
[Vol. 55
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the requisite mental state of "knowingly. 7 3
The jury found Byers guilty of both counts of deliberate homi-
cide. He was sentenced to two seventy-five-year terms for the de-
liberate homicides and fifteen years for the use of a weapon with
all terms to run consecutively. 7 ' Byers appealed his conviction and
argued that Montana's mental disease or defect statute unconstitu-
tionally shifted the burden of proof on the issue of mental state
from the prosecution to the defense. 5 The court summarily con-
cluded that the burden did not shift and that whether the Byer's
mental defect prevented him from having the requisite mental
state was a question for the jury. 6
Byers also claimed that the Montana law governing the mental
disease or defect violated his right to due process. 77 The court held
that Montana's statutory scheme evaluating the defendant's
mental disease or defect at the three different stages of criminal
proceedings provides adequate due process.78 The court relied on
its prior decision in Korell and said that no constitutional right to
plead insanity exists.7 9 Accordingly, the court in Byers found Mon-
tana's statutory structure constitutionally sound.80
IV. STATE V. COWAN
A. Statement of Facts
On April 24, 1990, Margaret Doherty (Doherty), a United
States Forest Service employee, returned to her living quarters in a
forest service cabin and discovered that someone had been in the
cabin eating food and watching television.8" Doherty locked the
doors and called the police. While on the phone with the police,
Doherty saw Cowan circling the cabin trying to gain entrance. He
called Doherty a "society bitch" and a "mechanic robot bitch," and
he yelled "it's my house" and other unintelligible statements.
82
Cowan also kicked at Doherty's car and pulled at her license
plates.8 3
Cowan found a tree-planting tool called a hodag and used it to
73. Id. at , 861 P.2d at 864.
74. Id. at __ 861 P.2d at 864.
75. Id. at -, 861 P.2d at 864.
76. Id. at , 861 P.2d at 864.
77. Id. at 861 P.2d at 866.
78. Id. at 861 P.2d at 866-67.
79. Id. at , 861 P.2d at 866.
80. Byers, - Mont. at -, 861 P.2d at 864-67.
81. State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 512, 861 P.2d 884, 885 (1993).
82. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Cowan (No. 93-1264).
83. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 520, 861 P.2d at 890 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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gain entry to the cabin. Cowan knew Doherty had called the police,
but he ignored the call and the gun Doherty pointed at him."4
When Doherty asked who he was, Cowan mimicked her and told
her to get out of his house. 5 When Cowan approached Doherty,
she tried to shoot the gun, but it misfired. Cowan then attacked
Doherty with the hodag and struck her repeatedly in the head,
arms, and shoulders until she fell into a semi-conscious state.
8 6
The officers who responded to Doherty's call found Cowan
outside of the cabin. When the officers approached him at gun-
point, Cowan ran away to retrieve his backpack. Cowan, however,
did not try to escape, and the officers found him waiting next to
the mess hall where he surrendered quietly.87 The officers then
found Doherty, severely injured, lying in the kitchen.88
Several psychologists and psychiatrists examined Cowan prior
to trial, and each of them concluded that he suffered from para-
noid schizophrenia, a form of mental disease.8 9 For example, Dr.
Hoell, a psychiatrist for the defense who studied Cowan and his
medical history, testified that Cowan had been hospitalized in the
past for depression, psychotic disorder, and schizophrenia. He di-
agnosed Cowan as suffering from schizophrenia, which includes
symptoms of hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia. During their
conversations, Cowan described delusional thoughts about people
being programmed by religious groups and the government. Dr.
Hoell opined that Cowan suffered from a psychotic state at the
time of the attack on Doherty and that Cowan could not under-
stand the reality or the criminality of his conduct.90
B. Procedure
Cowan was charged with attempted deliberate homicide and
aggravated burglary.91  Following psychiatric evaluations of
Cowan's mental state, the court found Cowan competent to stand
trial.92 Cowan waived his right to a jury trial and filed a notice of
intent to inform the court that he would rely on mental disease to
disprove the necessary criminal state of mind." The sole issue in
84. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 4.
85. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 520, 861 P.2d at 890 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
86. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 5.
87. Id.; Cowan, 260 Mont. at 520, 861 P.2d at 891 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
88. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 512, 861 P.2d at 885.
89. Id. at 521, 861 P.2d at 891 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 10.
92. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 512, 861 P.2d at 885.
93. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 10-11. Montana law requires the defendant to
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Cowan was whether Cowan should be acquitted by reason of in-
sanity.e4 Defense counsel filed a memorandum that challenged
Montana's statutory scheme and argued that the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment guarantee the right to an acquittal based on
the insanity defense. On December 20, 1990, the court found
Cowan guilty as charged.9 5 During the sentencing hearing in Feb-
ruary 1991, the court considered whether Cowan should be con-
fined in prison or in a mental hospital. The court sentenced Cowan
to serve sixty years in the Montana State Prison.ee
Cowan appealed to the Montana Supreme Court raising three
issues: (1) whether the State proved the necessary mental state of
the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether Mon-
tana's statutory scheme governing mental disease or defect estab-
lishes a conclusive presumption of criminal intent; and (3) whether
sending Cowan to prison violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Montana Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
7
C. Analysis
In Cowan, the supreme court first analyzed the issue of mental
state.9 To convict Cowan of attempted deliberate homicide, the
State had to prove that Cowan "knowingly" or "purposely" at-
tempted to cause the death of another human being.99 The aggra-
vated burglary charge required that he "knowingly" entered an oc-
cupied structure with the purpose to commit an offense while
armed with a weapon."°° While Cowan admitted the conduct ele-
ments of the crimes, he denied that he had the requisite mental
state of "purposely" or "knowingly.
101
Cowan argued that the expert testimony regarding his mental
file a pretrial notice of his intent to rely on mental disease to prove that he lacked the
necessary mental state. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323(3) (1993).
94. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 11. Petitioner alleged that because Montana
abolished insanity as an independent defense, the only grounds for an insanity acquittal
occur when a defendant shows that he could not act deliberately to meet the requisite
mental state of knowingly or purposely. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 11.
95. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 11; see also Cowan, 260 Mont. at 512, 861
P.2d at 885.
96. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 12.
97. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 511, 861 P.2d at 885.
98. Id. at 512, 861 P.2d at 886.
99. Id. at 512-13, 861 P.2d at 886 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-4-103, 45-5-102
(1993)).
100. Id. at 513, 861 P.2d at 886 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-204(2)(a) (1993)).
101. Id.
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illness clearly raised a reasonable doubt about whether he deliber-
ately committed the crimes.102 Cowan argued that the evidence
showed that he suffered from schizophrenia and that he suffered a
psychotic episode at the time of the attack. The State, however,
contested Cowan's credibility and argued that he exaggerated his
symptoms.10 3 The State further contended that Cowan's schizo-
phrenic states occurred sporadically and that no means existed to
determine whether Cowan suffered from a psychotic episode at the
time of the attack.
1 04
The supreme court acknowledged that the trier of fact deter-
mines the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses. Based on
that general rule, the court found that the trier of fact could have
weighed the evidence and deduced that Cowan had not suffered a
psychotic state at the time of the attack. The court further rea-
soned that the existence of a mental disease or defect does not pre-
vent a person from acting knowingly or purposely.10 5 The court
found sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding
that Cowan was lucid at the time of the attack, that he knew Do-
herty was a human, not a robot, and that he possessed the requi-
site mental state to be convicted of attempted deliberate homicide
and aggravated burglary.
10 6
Cowan next asserted that the statutory scheme governing the
presentation of evidence of mental disease or defect established a
conclusive presumption of criminal intent and, thus, violated the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana."°7 In Sandstrom, the trial court gave a jury instruction which
stated that a defendant "intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts."' 08 The Supreme Court held that the instruction
created an impermissible presumption in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause.10 9 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the presumption relieved the prosecution of the bur-
den of proving mental state, an element of the crime, because it
required an inference of criminal intent from the criminal
102. Id. at 513, 861 P.2d at 886.
103. Id. at 514, 861 P.2d at 886. Cowan did not describe the delusion that Doherty was
a robot until his third interview with the State psychologist. Another psychologist also testi-
fied that Cowan frequently lies to get out of trouble. Id. at 514, 861 P.2d at 886-87.
104. Id. at 514, 861 P.2d at 886.
105. Id. at 514, 861 P.2d at 887 (citing the decision in State v. Byers, Mont. , 861
P.2d 860 (1993)).
106. Id. at 515, 861 P.2d at 887.
107. Id. at 516, 861 P.2d at 887-88 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979)).
108. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 513.
109. Id. at 524.
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conduct.1 '
Although the court gave no jury instructions because Cowan
had a bench trial, Cowan contended that the district judge relied
on statutes which created a conclusive presumption of mental
state."' Cowan argued that, although section 46-14-102 of the
Montana Code allows evidence of mental disease or defect to prove
or disprove the requisite mental state of the crime charged, the
mental defect does not constitute a valid defense in itself. Cowan
alleged that any evidence of organized conduct allows an inference
of criminal intent. Consequently, Cowan argued, a court will never
acquit someone who commits a criminal act because each crime in-
volves at least a minimal level of organized conduct.1 '
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the abolition of the insanity defense, finding that Cowan's due pro-
cess right had not been violated. The court cited its previous deci-
sions in Byers and Korell and reasoned that the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution does not require the use
of any particular insanity test or allocation of burden of proof."3
The court noted that the language of section 45-5-112 of the
Montana Code states that conduct "may" suffice to establish crim-
inal intent and that the fact finder determines whether the defend-
ant possessed the requisite intent."' The court concluded that the
statute creates a permissive inference rather than a conclusive pre-
sumption and does not violate the Sandstrom doctrine. 1 5
Finally, Cowan asserted that his sentence to the Montana
State Prison violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Cowan argued that the punishment constituted inhumane
110. Id. at 523.
111. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 516, 861 P.2d at 888.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). In Leland, the Court upheld an
Oregon statute that placed the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the
defendant. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the State retained the burden
to prove the requisite mental state. The Court refused the defendant's argument that he
had a right to the irresistible impulse test form of an insanity defense. Instead, the United
States Supreme Court held that the individual states can determine the test for criminal
insanity and which party has the burden of proof on the issue of insanity. Leland, 343 U.S.
at 798-99.
During the last 30 years, courts have interpreted Leland very differently. Some courts
have concluded, based on Leland, that a state can deny the insanity defense altogether. See,
e.g., State v. Byers, - Mont. - , - , 861 P.2d 860, 866 (1993). Other courts have
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that Leland requires some form of the insanity
defense. See, e.g., California v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1985).
114. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 516, 861 P.2d at 888; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-112
(1993).
115. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 517, 861 P.2d at 888.
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treatment. He contended that considering a defendant's insanity
only for the purpose of reducing the degree of the crime or deter-
mining the punishment for the crime qualifies as cruel and unusual
punishment and a violation of due process. " 6 The court refused to
adopt Cowan's argument that the insanity defense constitutes a
fundamental right dictated by the Constitution.' 7 Instead, the
court held that no specific insanity defense is required by the Due
Process Clause. The court reasoned that Montana's criminal proce-
dures, which consider the defendant's mental defect at three stages
of a trial, provide adequate due process."'
The court reiterated a passage from Korell, where it reasoned
that while Montana's statutory scheme governing mentally ill de-
fendants does not further the goals of deterrence or prevention be-
cause the defendant is unable to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct, the statutes promote the goals of protection of society
and education. " 9 Finally, the court clarified that the district court
placed Cowan in the custody of the Department of Institutions,
not prison, and that the Department of Institutions could deter-
mine whether Cowan needed treatment at a facility other than the
state prison.12 0
D. The Dissent
Justice Trieweiler dissented in a lengthy opinion in which Jus-
tice Hunt joined.' 2' Trieweiler concluded that Montana's abolition
of the insanity defense in 1979 violated the defendant's constitu-
tional right of due process.'2 2 Trieweiler stated that Montana's
statutory scheme regarding mental defect contradicts fundamental
principles of fairness prevalent in judicial systems for more than
700 years.'2 3 Trieweiler deduced a conclusion opposite of the ma-
jority's in his interpretation of Leland v. Oregon.'24 According to
Trieweiler, Leland stands for the proposition that the United
116. Id.
117. Id. at 517-18, 861 P.2d at 888-89.
118. Id. at 518, 861 P.2d at 889. The present statutory scheme prescribes that the
court consider the defendant's mental disease or defect before trial to determine compe-
tency to stand trial, during trial to disprove mental state, and during sentencing. MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102, -103, -201(2), -221, -311, -312 (1993); see State v. Korell, 213 Mont.
316, 690 P.2d 992, 996-97 (1984).
119. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 517, 861 P.2d at 889 (quoting Korell, 213 Mont. at 334, 690
P.2d at 1002).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 518-27, 861 P.2d at 889-95.
122. Id. at 518, 861 P.2d at 889.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Leland, 343 U.S. 790).
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States Constitution requires no specific form of the insanity de-
fense. Trieweiler reasoned, however, that implicit in the Leland
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that due process
requires some form of the insanity defense.12 5
Trieweiler asserted that Montana's abolition of the insanity
defense, and the present statutory scheme inadequately protect a
mentally ill defendant by simply allowing a court the option of
considering mental illness when deciding punishment."' Trieweiler
stated that the statutes only theoretically allow evidence of mental
defect to disprove the requisite mental state. In actuality, the only
state of mind necessary is knowingly or purposely, and no element
requires that the defendant cognitively understand the criminality
of his conduct or that he be able to conform his conduct to abide
by the law. 2 7 Trieweiler opined that the facts of Cowan present
the "worst case scenario" of how Montana's statutory scheme inad-
equately and unconstitutionally addresses mentally ill
defendants. 2 '
Trieweiler further denounced the majority's reliance on the
decision in Korell because he felt the court in Korell relied heavily
on a misinterpretation of Leland.2 ' The dissent pointed out that
the United States Supreme Court has not decided the issue of
whether a state can constitutionally abolish the insanity defense.'
However, three state courts have found unconstitutional their state
statutes that attempted to abolish the insanity defense. 13
Trieweiler said that the majority distinguished those prior deci-
sions because Montana's statutory scheme permits a limited
amount of evidence of mental defect, but he found that the stat-
utes provide inadequate protection for the mentally ill criminal de-
fendant. 3 2 Finally, Trieweiler concluded that the insanity defense
125. Id. at 518-19, 861 P.2d at 889. Trieweiler relied on Skinner, 704 P.2d at 752, in
which the California Supreme Court cited Leland for the opposite proposition than did the
Montana Supreme Court. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 518-19, 861 P.2d at 889.
126. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 520, 861 P.2d at 890.
127. Id. at 520, 861 P.2d at 890. Trieweiler argued that some form of the M'Naghten
test be in place.
128. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 523, 861 P.2d at 892 (describing Cowan's irrational behav-
ior, his apparent delusions, and the several psychiatric evaluations diagnosing him with seri-
ous mental illness).
129. Id. at 523-24, 861 P.2d at 892-93.
130. Id. at 524, 861 P.2d at 893.
131. See Sinclair v. Mississippi, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931); Louisiana v. Lange, 123 So.
639 (La. 1929); Washington v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910).
132. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 524, 861 P.2d at 893. Trieweiler emphasized the importance
of the insanity defense throughout the history of criminal law, and he referred repeatedly to
Justice McDevitt's strong dissent in Idaho v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990). Cowan, 260
Mont. at 524, 861 P.2d at 893.
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is implicit in the doctrine of ordered liberty as evidenced by histor-
ical precedence and its nearly universal acceptance in American
jurisdictions. 133
E. Cowan's Petition to the United States Supreme Court
In January 1994, Joe Junior Cowan petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.134 Cowan's petition
asserted that Montana's statutory scheme governing mental dis-
ease and defect violates his right to due process and results in a
constitutional shifting of the burden of proof on the issue of
mental state in contradiction of Sandstrom v. Montana."'5 The Su-
preme Court, however, denied Cowan's petition for certiorari." 6
V. ANALYSIS OF MONTANA'S STATUTORY STRUCTURE FOR MENTAL
DISEASE AND DEFECT
Despite the United States Supreme Court's denial of Cowan's
petition for certiorari, the Montana Legislature should carefully re-
assess the implications of the present statutory scheme governing
mental disease and defect.1 3 7 Montana's mental disease and defect
statutes do not provide adequate due process, and the statutes of-
fend traditional notions of fairness and mercy for the mentally ill.
Montana's statutory scheme purports to permit evidence of mental
disease or defect at three stages of a criminal proceeding.13 8 In
practice, however, the statutes governing mental disease or defect
afford inadequate protection to the defendant, such as Cowan, who
suffers from severe mental illness.
In cases of extreme mental illness, a court will presumably
consider the mental defect of the accused and determine that the
defendant is unfit to stand trial. If so, the defendant receives treat-
ment in an appropriate institution and avoids a criminal convic-
tion. However, determinations of incompetence only rarely occur
because the statutory language requires that the defendant cannot
understand the charge against the defendant or assist in the de-
133. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 526, 861 P.2d at 894 (commenting that the only jurisdictions
without an insanity defense are Montana, Idaho, and Utah).
134. State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 861 P.2d 884 (1993), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1264).
135. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at i, Cowan (No. 93-1264).
136. State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 861 P.2d 884 (1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W.
3640 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1994) (No. 93-1264).
137. The Supreme Court's denial of Cowan's petition for certiorari does not preclude
the possibility that Montana's statutory scheme governing criminal responsibility is uncon-
stitutional or that certiorari will be granted in a future case.
138. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102, -103, -311 (1993); see supra part III.
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fendant's own defense, not merely that the person suffers from a
mental illness. 139
If deemed competent to stand trial, the defendant can intro-
duce evidence of the defendant's mental illness for the second time
to show that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state of the
crime. 1 0 The evidence, however, generally does not suffice to rebut
an assertion that the defendant acted knowingly or purposely. The
failure results from the broad statutory definitions of knowingly
and purposely, which permit the fact finder to infer intent from
the action."' "Knowingly" and "purposely" neither require cogni-
tive awareness of the criminality of the act nor volitional capacity
to establish the mental state element of the crime. Evidence of
mental illness will negate mental state only in the few cases of
drastic mental defect where the defendant is so delusional that he
does not comprehend his physical acts. 142 The defendant need not
139. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (1993).
140. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1993).
141. Section 45-2-101(33) of the Montana Code defines "knowingly" as follows:
[A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of his conduct or that the cir-
cumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct
described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that it is highly proba-
ble that such result will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of the exis-
tence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is estab-
lished if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(33) (1993). Section 45-2-101(58) of the Montana Code defines
"purposely" as follows:
[A] person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a
statute defining an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or
to cause that result. When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the
element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition
negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(58) (1993).
142. For example, if someone killed another person because he thought God told him
to, he intended the act of killing. Thus, in Montana that defendant could be determined to
have acted knowingly. The ABA presented a hypothetical somewhat similar to Cowan's situ-
ation in its amicus curiae brief that argued against the abolition of the insanity defense as
follows:
[The abolitionist approach] would give no exculpatory significance to even the
most overpowering delusions in those cases where a defendant, notwithstanding
psychotic illness, knew at the most superficial level what he was doing. Thus, a
paranoid schizophrenic suffering severe delusions of persecution and fearing
imagined attempts upon his life would be convicted of theft if he, for example,
knowingly and intentionally stole a radio from a department store. It would no
matter that delusions of persecution led him to believe that he had to have that
particular radio in order to receive FBI bulletins regarding the whereabouts of his
imagined assassins. Nor would it matter that his delusions led him to conclude
that he had to steal the radio so that there would be no record of his possession of
that radio. Evidence of his delusions would simply be irrelevant on the issue of his
intent to take the property of another and, as a result, would be inadmissible.
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have acted with "mens rea" or wrongful intent; he simply must
have intended his physical action.
Montana's statutory scheme regarding mental disease or de-
fect enables the fact finder to infer criminal intent from evidence
of the physical act without an actual finding of the requisite
mental state. Montana's statutory scheme, therefore, contradicts
the rule enunciated in Sandstrom v. Montana4 ' by essentially re-
lieving the State of the burden of proving mental state.'" The bur-
den is lifted because the "evidence of organized or integrated con-
duct may suffice to establish criminal intent.' 1 5 Fact finders,
consequently, are likely to find intent based on the defendant's ac-
tions alone, despite that the defendant suffered from the delusions
of a severe mental defect.
Even if the inference of intent from action did not shift the
burden of proof from the state to the defense, the inference of in-
tent from the defendant's actions can be attacked because it is not
a reasonable inference.'" Fact finders can reasonably infer intent
from the actions of mentally competent defendants who under-
stand and control their conduct. However, the inference becomes
an unwarranted when viewed in terms of mentally ill defendants
who do not understand their actions or the potential consequences
of their conduct. An inference must be based on proven facts and
warranted deductions from those facts." 7 A fact finder cannot war-
rant an inference of criminal intent deduced from the actions of a
delusional schizophrenic, or someone with a similar mental defect.
A court considers a defendant's mental disease or defect for
the third time during the sentencing stage of a criminal proceed-
ing. At that stage, the court determines whether the defendant
should be committed to a mental institution or to the state
prison." 8 The trial judge's consideration of mental defect during
Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Bar Association at 7, United States v. Lyons, 731
F.2d 243 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984).
143. 442 U.S. 510 (1979); see supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
144. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 26-29.
145. Cowan, 260 Mont. at 516, 861 P.2d at 888.
146. Section 26-1-502 of the Montana Code provides:
An inference must be founded:
(1) on a fact legally proved; and
(2) on such a deduction from that fact as is warranted by a consideration of
the usual propensities or passions of men, the particular propensities or passions
of the person whose act is in question, the course of business, or the course of
nature.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-502 (1993).
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-502 (1993).
148. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (1993).
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the sentencing phase of the trial affords the judge unfettered dis-
cretion to decide the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.14'9 Men-
tally ill defendants, convicted of a crime they may not have under-
stood or controlled, must endure the social stigma of criminal
convictions even if the court elects to commit them to the care of
the Department of Institutions. Based on the judge's discretion,
the defendant may be sent to prison and not receive needed
treatment."'
A criminal system absent the insanity defense contravenes the
notion that a criminal conviction represents society's judgment
that a person has chosen to violate social, moral, and legal princi-
ples. 151 People unable to understand their own actions or conform
their conduct to the law suffer from mental illnesses. They need
treatment from trained professionals, not the disgrace, shame, and
punishment of criminal convictions. Convicting those defendants
for crimes that lacked criminal intent advances no goal of deter-
rence. 1 2 Instead, the conviction may result in the imprisonment of
a severely mentally ill defendant. Allowing a judge the broad dis-
cretion to determine if the defendant's condition warrants hospi-
talization may not provide adequate protection for the defend-
ant. 53 Consequently, Montana's abolition of the insanity defense
disregards traditional notions of fairness."'
VI. CONCLUSION
Because defendants have abused the insanity defense with
false pleas of insanity, lawmakers have adopted reforms in criminal
responsibility legislation. Unfortunately, the reforms have been fu-
eled by a few well-publicized cases that represented a threat to
149. See generally David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal
Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 279 (1993) (discussing and criticizing the role that judges
play as social workers and the therapeutic and rehabilitative consequences of their
decisions).
150. Consider the irony of sending a paranoid schizophrenic, who struggles to function
under the best of conditions because of his delusional fear, to an overcrowded and danger-
ous prison full of convicted criminals.
151. Kathryn J. Fritz, The Proposed Federal Insanity Defense: Should the Quality of
Mercy Suffer for the Sake of Safety?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 65 (1984).
152. Montana's constitution states under a section entitled "Rights of the Convicted"
that "laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of prevention and
reformation." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28.
153. See Wexler, supra note 149.
154. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 532. The ABA opposes the abolition of the insanity
defense, which it finds to be "an important moral underpinning of our criminal law."
Rather, the ABA supports a cognitive test of criminal responsibility. Wexler, supra note 13,
at 532.
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public safety.155 Cases, such as Hinckley,"' have created a public
misperception that the insanity defense is commonly used and
abused, often resulting in the acquittal of dangerous offenders.
Public concern stems from the fraudulent uses of the insanity de-
fense and defendants who have used it to "beat the rap." However,
lawmakers should recognize and protect defendants who suffer
true mental illnesses. For those persons, the insanity defense im-
parts essential protection, and no adequate substitute exists. This
balancing of society's need for protection and the right of the men-
tally ill has proven an almost impossible task, and criminal respon-
sibility law remains tenuous. Cowan presents a perfect example of
a case in which the insanity defense is crucial to a fair and moral
legal system. Cowan suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. During
and after his crime, he behaved in a manner unique to a person
burdened with a severe mental illness. Cowan acted under the de-
lusional belief that Doherty was a robot. Yet, under Montana's
statutory definition, he acted "knowingly" because he knew that he
was hitting the robot with a weapon. Cowan intended his physical
acts, and the fact finder inferred the requisite mental state of
knowingly. This inference is not reasonable when applied to a de-
fendant like Cowan who suffers from delusions and a severe mental
defect. Cowan did not understand his acts or their criminality, but
the lack of criminal intent or mens rea is irrelevant to the Montana
Supreme Court's analysis under Montana law.
Cowan illustrates the need for change in Montana law. In its
present state, Montana's statutory scheme circumvents a defend-
ant's right to due process by postponing the court's primary con-
sideration of mental disease or defect until the dispositional stage
of the trial. As a result, a defendant suffering from a severe mental
illness may be criminally convicted. Although the insanity defense
occasionally facilitates fraud and abuse, it also protects the fair
treatment of mentally ill defendants. To adequately protect men-
tally ill defendants, the Montana Legislature should consider rein-
stating the pre-1979 mental disease and defect laws and restore in-
sanity as an affirmative defense. The protection provided by the
insanity defense is indispensable in a criminal system based on
fairness and due process.
155. Wexler, supra note 13, at 528.
156. United States v. Hinkley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 55
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/12
